Events

Date: 22 January 2026   Time: 14:00 - 15:00

Location: Hybrid: SMS MB503, QMUL, or via the Teams link below

We develop an econometric framework for recovering structural primitives—-such as marginal costs—-from price or quantity data generated by firms whose decisions are governed by reinforcement-learning algorithms. Guided by recent theory and simulations showing that such algorithms can learn to approximate repeated-game equilibria, we impose only the minimal optimality conditions implied by equilibrium, while remaining agnostic about the algorithms' hidden design choices and the resulting conduct—-competitive, collusive, or anywhere in between. These weak restrictions yield set identification of the primitives; we characterise the resulting sets and construct estimators with valid confidence regions. Monte-Carlo simulations confirm that our bounds contain the true parameters across a wide range of algorithm specifications, and that the sets tighten substantially when exogenous demand variation across markets is exploited. The framework thus offers a practical tool for empirical analysis and regulatory assessment of algorithmic behaviour.

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